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Abstract 
Geographical Information System (GIS) is getting  popular  in controlling  of risk in chemical installations for  
handling hazardous substances. The capability of GIS is to combine image map with the corresponding 
information at each level offering is being recognized as  a new dimension to the management of industrial 
safety and environment surrounding. Catastrophic failure of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) terminal is always 
regarded to failure its storage tank. A BLEVE is recognized as one of the worst type accidents cause of life and 
property. Consequences of BLEVE event are rapid and include peak over pressure from the blast, missiles 
projection from ruptured vessels and broken structures. This paper emphasizes on a methodology to evaluate 
effects of peak over pressure and missiles events from the BLEVE hazard due to catastrophic failure of a storage 
tank which filled by  140 tons of LPG. TNT model and selected equations are  used to estimate the probability 
of fatality and structure damages and GIS techniques is used as a tool for analysis explosion due to a BLEVE 
event in LPG terminal. The developed technology capable to  estimate  explosion effects  from a BLEVE event 
in which the result of consequences are plotted by buffer zones 10%, 50%, and 90% likelihood for managing 
risk in an industrial zone. Stakeholders can make use the developed technology for mitigating risk  of LPG 
explosion in  a LPG terminal and also for future land development in the areas outside of  an industrial zone.  
Keywords: LPG; GIS; BLEVE; Probit; Explosion. 
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1. Introduction 
LPG is the abbreviation or short form of liquid natural gas.  It comprises of two major  mixture of hydrocarbon 
(propane and butane) stored in liquid form under pressurised conditions in steel cylinders or bulk storage tanks.  
Utilisation of LPG seems more attractive than other liquid and solid fuels due its clean burning, simplicity of its 
plant design and operation, ease of its handling; and plant operation, available in potable cylinders or can be 
supplied by pipeline system  from bullets or spheres tanks. Release of LPG from its installations due to failures 
of pipework  or vessels could propagate to emergency situations and  ultimately to fire and explosion disaster. 
Fire is the most common but explosion is more significant in terms of its damage potential, often leading to 
fatalities and damage to property. The most severe LPG disaster in history was Mexico City on 1984. At the 
time of the disaster the complete storage may have contained (11,000-12,000) 3m  of LPG. Approximately 500 
people were killed and over 7,000 were seriously injured [1]. The development in geographic information 
system (GIS) technology has come a long way in the past decade. It was first introduced by Canadian 
Government in early 1960 [2] GIS can provide a comprehensive database of contaminated site conditions, tool 
for spatial and customized interface of risk assessment, and visual presentation of modelling results and site 
conditions. Especially, integration of the risk assessment results with spatial land-use information will be helpful 
for identifying and assessing hazard impacts on specific receptors through various exposure pathways, where 
map can be valuable for risk analysis.  
This paper presents an application of mathematical models with integration of GIS to evaluate the final events 
hazards i.e  blast wave from the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour explosion BLEVE/ and  fragmentations.  
2. Explosion Assessment of LPG 
The main damage effect of any flammable gas accident is results of blast wave coming   from explosion due to 
BLEVE/fireball. A blast wave generated from  an explosion in air that is accompanied by sudden rise in 
pressure. Pressure effects are limited in magnitudes and thus, the main interest is to predict domino effects on 
adjacent vessels and equipment rather than assessing harm to neighbouring communities. The blast effects can 
be estimated from the TNT equivalence method. The blast wave generated by an explosion event may cause 
building damage or personnel injury. Workers may be injured as a result of direct or indirect effects of an 
explosion. Direct effects result from direct exposure to the blast wave generated from an explosion. For 
example, eardrum rupture and lung haemorrhage can occur from direct exposure to excessive overpressures. 
Pressure effects are usually limited to a small area and the effect of pressure on the environment is therefore 
seldom discussed. When people are killed due to blast waves, it is usually because objects fall on them. Indirect 
effects of an explosion include injuries resulting from building damage (e.g., collapse of a wall or root) or flying 
fragments. The same discussion as for humans is also valid, for both the general environment and animals; 
namely any adverse effect or injuries are more dependent on being hit by a flying object [3]. This present paper 
is concerns with calculating the potential hazards to humans and constructions. 
2.1 Estimation the Explosion Hazards 
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The TNT equivalent model has been widely used to model vapour cloud explosions. An early application was 
that of Brasie and Simpson [4], who used it to study the damage from three accidental explosions. Crowl D. and 
Louvar J, [5] used TNT method to estimate the damage for common structures and process equipment. This 
damage is result of the explosion. The explosion is involving peak overpressure and flammable material. The 
TNT is the easier model and it is based on the assumption of equivalence between the flammable material and 
TNT, factored by an explosion yield term. An equivalence mass of TNT is calculated using the following 
equation [6]. 
TNT
c
TNT E
Hm
m
∆
=
η                                                                                                           (1) 
where  
TNTm  is the equivalent mass of TNT (kg),  
η  is the empirical explosion efficiency (0.01-0.10),  
m is the mass of explosive (kg), 
cH∆  is the lower heat of combustion (kJ/kg) and  
TNTE  is the energy of explosion of TNT, (kJ/kg).  
The distance to a given overpressure is calculated from the equation (Ozog, 1996): 
( ) ( )[ ]231 ln0398.0ln7241.05031.3exp3967.0 ooTNT ppmr +−×=                                (2) 
where  
r  is the distance, ( )m ,  
cH∆  is the lower heat of combustion ( )kgkcal  and  
0p  is the peak overpressure ( )Psi , 
The logic diagram for using TNT method for calculation on the effects of peak overpressure from explosion 
hazard is summarized in Figure 1. 
The TNT equivalence predicts peak overpressure with distance. It should be noted that the pressure depends 
strongly on the distance between the place of the explosion and the structure. Depend on locations of the 
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explosive charge., the consequences of same explosive charge give very different overpressures The principal 
parameters of the blast wave from TNT explosion are the peak overpressure, 0p , the impulse of the positive 
phase duration, pi  and the duration of the positive phase of  dt  [7,8], have given their values of the peak 
overpressure, impulse and duration time from an explosion of 1 kg of TNT in the form of network equations.  
The scaled peak over pressure:  
( )[ ]
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] 5.025.025.02
2
35.1132.01048.01
50.41808
zzz
zps
+++
+
=                     (3) 
for the impulse: 
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and for the scaled duration time: 
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+++
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=                                  (5) 
where  
sp : is the scaled peak over pressure,  
pi : is the impulse ( )msbar. ,  
dt : is the duration time ( )ms ,  
m : is the mass of explosive ( )kg  and 
z : is the scaled distance ( )kgm  
In order to estimate the consequences of an accident on people, a function relating the magnitude of the impact, 
usually, the method used is the Probit analysis, which relates the Probit (from “probability unit”) variable to the 
probability. Probit analysis has been widely used to express injury relations [9, 10. 11, 12, 13.,14]. The Probit 
variable ,Y  is a measure of the percentage of a population submitted to effect with a given intensity ( )V  which 
will undergo certain damage. This variable follows a normal distribution, with an average value of 5 and a 
normal deviation of 1. 
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Figure 1: Logic diagram for the calculation the peak overpressure and its harm as result from explosion hazard. 
 
The relationship between the Probit variable (Y) and the probability ( )rP  is the following [15]: 
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Eq. (6) provides a relationship between the probability rP  and the Probit variable Y. for spreadsheet 
computations a more useful expression for performing the conversion from Probits to percentage is given by [4]: 













 −
−
−
+=
2
5
5
5150
Y
erf
Y
YPr                                                           (7) 
where erf is the error function and for rational approximation for digital computation becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( ) εφφφ +−++−≈ 233221 exp1 xaaaxerf                                 (8) 
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where: 
( )xαφ += 1
1
      ;        47047.0=α         ;         34802.01 =a ; ……………  .(9) 
 09587.02 −=a  ;        74785.03 =a     and       
5105.2 −×≤ε  
Most of the previous works about Probit analysis [12, 13. 14, 15, 16, 17 ]. The following expression is normally 
used to calculate the value of Y: 
VbaY ln+=                                                                                         (10) 
where Y  is the Probit variable, a and b are constants which are experimentally determined from the information 
on accidents, or, in some cases, from experimentation with animals. V  is a measure of intensity of the 
damaging effect; it can be just one parameter (for example, the overpressure in this case) or a combination of 
various parameters (for example, the concentration and time in toxic gas release). 
2.2   Effects of Overpressure on Humans and Constructions 
The direct effects of overpressure on humans are eardrum rupture, lung haemorrhage, whole body displacement 
injury and injury from shatter glasses. It must be remembered that the most likely harm to people in an 
explosion results from the indirect effects of them being inside or close to a building or wall when it collapses. 
The typical causes from explosion are; (i) burning, (ii) fragments hitting the people, (iii) buildings or other 
structure falling down or being disintegrated, (iv) people falling or “flaying” and subsequently hitting a solid 
object. The Probit equation for eardrum rupture is giving by Eq. (11) [9]: 
opY ln93.16.15 +−=                                                                             (11) 
Direct blast effects, particularly lung haemorrhage have been studied by Eisenberg et. al., (1975): 
opY ln91.61.77 +−=                                                                               (12) 
The shattering of window glass is an important blast damage effect, since the flaying glass can cause severe 
injury to human. There have been a number of experimental and theoretical studies of the behaviour of 
shattering and flying glass and also studies of glass breakage following accidental explosions. [9] gives Eq. (13) 
to estimate the glass breakage from peak overpressure: 
opY ln79.21.18 +−=                                                                                 (13) 
Eisenberg et. al., (1975) have derived a Probit equation relating lethality for body translation to impulse: 
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JY ln82.41.46 +−=                                                                                  (14) 
with:  ( )dttpJ
td
∫=
0
0                                                                                                    (15) 
where: 
J  is the impulse ( )sPa.  
0p  is incident overpressure ( )Pa  
Structural damage caused by blast waves from explosions has traditionally been correlated in terms of the peak 
overpressure of the explosion. The effects of the blast damage on the construction are based on the 
determination of the peak overpressure resulting from the pressure wave. Good estimates of blast damage, 
however, can be obtained using just the peak overpressure. It is important to know that the small structures 
suffer less from diffraction loading because the time interval in which the shock wave envelopes the object may 
be less than the plastic response of the object to differential loading. For very large buildings and structures, 
differential loading may cause damage ranging up to complete destruction. Damage to a building in the case of 
an accident gas explosion is not a serious problem as long as the building is not collapsing or dangerous 
fragments are not generated within or from the building. The following Probit equation has been applied for 
determine effect of building damage due  to gas explosion [9]: 
opY ln92.28.23 +−=                                                                    (16) 
2.3   Fragmentation Hazards 
When the explosion occurs in a close system, fragments of the containment may form missiles. Therefore it’s 
important to consider the analysis of the fragments generated by the explosion hazard. Lees [7] has indicated 
that there were 113 events involving fire on which sufficient information was available and of these 89 involved 
fragment generation. Fragmentations are potentially the furthest reaching immediate hazard from a blast wave 
and BLEVE. Fragmentations are also one of the most difficult hazards to quantify accurately because of their 
random behaviour [18]. Projectiles will generate from a blast wave, which are parts of the rocket or buildings. 
These can travel distances up to the order of kilometres. Basically there are two kinds of projectiles: (i) Primary 
projectiles which are major pieces of the tank and (ii) Secondary projectiles which are generated by the 
acceleration of nearby objects (attached pipe, support legs, other attachments, adjacent structures or objects, 
etc.). The fragments can travel considerable distances and they are sometimes accompanied with quantities of 
burning LPG. Analyses of the travel range of fragment missiles from a number of BLEVEs suggest that the 
majority land within 700 m. Some, however, have been observed at over 1000 m from the site. The direction is 
difficult to predict but there is some evidence that cylindrical vessels tend to more likely to travel in the 
direction of their longitudinal axis [19]. The risk of missile damage is often low because the probability of being 
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is very low. However, if a large missile impacts there is a good chance for a domino event to result. It would 
usually be assumed that being hit by a large missile will result in death or severe damage to construction [18]. 
2.4    Blast Wave Hazard 
A blast wave is the result of an explosion in air that is accompanied by a very rapid rise in pressure. Pressure 
effects are usually limited in magnitude and are thus of interest mainly for prediction of domino effects on 
adjacent vessels and equipment rather than for harm to neighbouring communities. The blast effects can be 
estimated from the TNT equivalence method. The blast wave generated by an explosion event may cause 
building damage or personnel injury. Personnel may be injured as a result of direct or indirect effects of an 
explosion. Direct effects result from direct exposure to the blast wave generated from an explosion. For 
example, eardrum rupture and lung haemorrhage can occur from direct exposure to excessive overpressures. 
Pressure effects are usually limited to a small area and the effect of pressure on the environment is therefore 
seldom discussed. When people are killed due to blast waves, it is usually because objects fall on them. Indirect 
effects of an explosion include injuries resulting from building damage (e.g., collapse of a wall or root) or flying 
fragments. The same discussion as for humans is also valid, for both the general environment and animals; 
namely any adverse effect or injuries are more dependent on being hit by a flying object (Andersson, 1995). 
2.5 Estimation the Fragmentation Hazards 
It is possible to make approximate estimates of the behaviour and effects of the fragments from the container in 
which an explosion has occurred. The problem is considered under the following aspects; size, number, velocity, 
energy and range. This paper is discussed the danger distance, safety distance and projectile ranges. 
According to [20] as a crude approximation, projectile ranges it can be related to the fireball radius. The 
following is suggested as a guide: 
• 80 to 90% of rocketing fragments fall within 4 times the fireball radius. 
• Severe rocketing fragments may travel up to 15 times the fireball radius. 
• In very severe, rare cases, rocketing fragments may travel up to 30 times the fireball   radius.   
For estimating the danger areas, [21] has been assumed that the local public will have access to most places 
outside. The formula below has been given for danger areas where the public have access to the immediate area: 
( ) 61634 mrd =                                                                                                             (17) 
where: 
dr  is range, (m) and 
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m is weight of the explosive material, (kg) 
The fragmentation zone safety distance should be calculated to reduce the risk of harm from fragmentation 
thrown out from the explosion to those working on the worksite and to the local population. Theoretical 
methods can be used, but the calculation of fragmentation hazards zone areas is a more complex operation than 
that for blast hazard zone. [8] suggest a very simple formula for estimating a safety distance from a bomb 
explosion: 
33.0120 TNTs mr =                                                                                                                (18) 
where: 
sr  is the safety distance from missiles, (90 m minimum) 
It is well to know that, some explosion creates a crater and in this case fragments are ejected. A treatment of the 
fragments from cratering has been given by [22]. For the maximum range of fragments Richmond and Fletcher 
give the following equations: 
4.070 TNTr mR =       :Rock                                                                                               (19) 
4.030 TNTs mR =       :Soil                                                                                                 (20) 
where: 
R  is the maximum range, (ft) and 
TNTm  is the equivalent mass of TNT, ( )lb  
2.6 Estimation the Effects of the Missiles on Humans 
The risk of missile damage is often low because the probability of being hit is very low. However, if a large 
missile impacts on process plant there is a good chance that a domino event will result. It would usually be 
assumed that being hit by a large missile will result in death or severe damage to equipment. Fatality probability 
for human from missiles can be found from Eq. (27). This equation is using to calculate the average fatality 
probabilities for humans at distance from the detonation of high explosives (Merrifield, 2000). 
[ ] rp emH 01.0.01.0ln286.0 −=                                                                                         (21) 
where: 
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pH  is the average fatality probability for humans, 
m is quantity of explosive material, ( )kg , and 
r  is distance/range, ( )m .  
Lees, (1996) gives the following Probite for injury from missiles. 
JY ln26.41.27 +−=                                                                                                   (22) 
The logic diagram for the calculation the fragmentation hazards is presents in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Logic diagram for the calculation the fragmentation hazards as result from vessel incident. 
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3. Case study 
Geomedia Professional 5.1 was used to model an explosion due to BLEVE/fireball and the impact of the of the 
explosion in the area surrounding of a LPG terminal. The terminal is divided into five distinct areas: Unloading 
shed, LPG Storage area. The terminal is divided into five distinct areas: Unloading shed, LPG Storage area: 
LPG filling facility; Administration office , warehousing and utilities; and firewater system area. A LPG filling 
facility is located at the middle of the terminal, 15 m toward west of the administration building.  The system 
comprise of LPG filling pump shed, air compressor shed and LPG filling hall. LPG consist 40% propane and 
60% butane.  There was an average amount 140 metric tones (MT) of LPG stored in  a bullet type tank. It was 
transferred through outlet connections to an eight inch collection header towards the LPG filling pump shed 
which is located on the east side of the storage bullet, outside the bounded area. The pump shed consists of 4 
pumps (three on duty, one standby) which each having a pumping capacity of 30 m³/hr. The filling area is 
designed with high roof with open sides to allow for high ventilation rate and rapid dilution of any potential 
release of LPG vapor in the filling hall. A manually activated deluge system is provided to allow dispersion of 
any major leaks. The potential accidents that can occur at the LPG facility and thus, chance to release LPG was 
assessed from a combination of past history of release from similar installations and their specific information 
from hazard identification. Causes of failures were found due to failure  of hose, failure of mobile tanker 
component, failure of connecting system, failure of breakaway coupler, tanker departed while connected, human 
error [23]. Basically this paper is arranged into four main parts. First part is identification catastrophic accident 
whereby it is due to the overpressure and fragmentations from the BLEVE/fireball.in LPG terminal.  Second 
part is a modelling and estimation of explosion hazard. The third part is construction of a working GIS software 
environment that gives integration interface for the selected equations and procedures that are used to evaluating 
the hazard effect and the fourth parts is creation map for a target source. 
3.1 GIS For Risk Assessment 
An important element is the preparation of topical maps, using local GIS data around the accident site and for 
this case of study it was an industrial zone in  Malaysia. Maps, as a familiar format, are an effective basis for the 
communication of complex information by providing a familiar context. The most restrictive definition insists 
that a GIS must have a spatial data structure with topology, with geographic features linked to a relational 
database management system. Spatial analysis is the strength of GIS as is its ability to manipulate spatial data. 
With the facilities of handling large quantities of spatially referenced data and properly structured database, the 
GIS is able to manage, analyse, and display large multidisciplinary data sets for various applications with their 
geographical-related information. The role of the GIS, therefore, is to allow a modeller to visualize development 
changes to the landscape and to produce resultant input values for the individual models and create a map of a 
target source. 
3.2 Developing GIS System for LPG Case Study 
GIS enables the integrated model to handle the data management, computational aspects and the integrated 
needs as emphasized in the hazards approach. The data used in the creation of a GIS database include a location 
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map of the LPG tank. The map module is prepared for storing various types of GIS-related maps, such as the 
buildings, roads, stations, lakes and etc. The techniques allow the identification of areas that are affected by 
accidents. Building a database consists of three major steps: (a) identifying the geographic features, attributes, 
and required data layers; (b) defining the storage parameters for each attribute; and (c) ensure co-ordinate 
registration. The collection of cartographic data can be achieved by any of the alternative procedures: extent 
maps through digitizing, scanning, photogrammetric procedures or terrestrial surveying measurements. The 
results from the mathematical models can be linked with GIS software to create the hazard vulnerability maps. 
Figure 4 shows the building of the database into GIS to get the graphical results.  
 
Figure 4: Simplified architecture of GIS at an Industrial Zone in Malaysia 
The data used in developing of a GIS database include a map of place LPG terminal of an industrial zone. The 
map module is prepared for storing various types GIS related maps such as main road, highway, river and lots in 
the industrial zone (emphasized  in Figure 5 and Figure 13. The applied techniques permit the identification of 
areas that are exposed by the accidents. There are three steps to generate a database which are identifying the 
geographic features, attributes and required data layers; defining the storage parameters for each attribute and 
ensuring co-ordinate registration. 
4. Result and Discussion 
As discussed earlier, there are two major hazards are concerned for this discussion; peak overpressure and 
fragments generated from blast wave from BLEVE/fireball. It was envisaged  that the blast was due to BLEVE 
whereby all of LPG ( 140 metric ) contained in the storage tanks was jetted  to atmosphere after the tank broken 
American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2016) Volume 26, No  4, pp 343-363 
355 
 
and immediately ignited and exploded. The peak overpressure from the blast was calculated based on TNT 
model which is  the simplest model for calculating the explosion. Result of the calculation was plotted by buffer 
zones 10%, 50%, and 90% likelihood for further  analysis of   the consequences.   Peak overpressure  was 
calculated using Eq. (1) and the probabilities using  Eqs. (7) to (10) for eardrum rupture, lung haemorrhage, 
glass breakage, lethality for body translation to impulse, and construction damage Three major hazards will be 
discussed also; peak overpressure, fragments generated from blast wave and thermal radiation emitted from 
BLEVE/fireball. TNT model is the simplest model used for calculating the peak overpressure from the blast 
wave hazard. The probabilities for human casualty or construction damage have been calculated using Probit 
functions. The probabilities likely were drowned as buffer zones for 10, 50, and 90 % likelihood to evaluate the 
exact geographical region where the consequences are most intense for the population. Geomedia Professional 
5.1 is one of the GIS software and was used here to indicate the area to be affected by blast wave from explosion 
of LPG tank.  
Table 1 gives the effects of thermal radiation on construction [5]:  
Table 1: Effect of thermal radiation on construction 
Thermal 
radiation 
( )2mkW  
Effect 
 
Distance ( )m  
37.5 
 
 
23-25 
25 
18-20 
12.5 
 
12.6 
 
12 
Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure. 
Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress 
temperatures which can cause failures. 
Non-piloted ignition of wood occurs. 
Cable insulation degrades. 
Piloted ignition of wood occurs. 
Thermal stress level high enough to cause structural 
failure.  
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of 
wood, melting of plastic tubing. 
Plastic melts. 
286 
 
 
346-360 
346 
385-405 
481 
 
 
488 
491 
 
The results of peak overpressure from Equation (2) and the probabilities from Eqs. (11) to (16) for eardrum 
rupture, lung haemorrhage, glass breakage, lethality for body translation to impulse, and construction damage 
have been summarized in Table 2 and illustrated in Figures 1 to 5 respectively. According to the results 
tabulated in Table 1, the 90 % likelihood of eardrum rupture, lung haemorrhage, glass breakage, lethality for 
body translation to impulse, and construction damage will cover 4418 2m , 2552 2m , 79 2m , 184745 2m  and 
24053 2m  of area around the LPG tank. 
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Table 2: Probabilities for human fatality or injury by peak overpressure 
 
Human Effect 
 
( )mr  
 
( )kPapo  
 
sec).(kpaip  
 
(sec)dt  
 
rP ( )%  
 
Eardrum Rupture 
 
219 
124 
75 
17 
43 
109 
0.03 
0.05 
0.07 
0.58 
0.41 
0.27 
10 
50 
90 
 
Lung Haemorrhage 
 
74 
65 
57 
113 
147 
191 
0.075 
0.083 
0.910 
0.26 
0.24 
0.21 
10 
50 
90 
 
Death due to impulse 
90 
68 
10 
89 
164 
8140 
0.065 
0.080 
0.141 
0.312 
0.246 
0.007 
10 
50 
90 
 
Glass Breakage           
 
1302 
782 
485 
2 
4 
8 
0.005 
0.008 
0.012 
0.79 
0.78 
0.74 
10 
50 
90 
 
Construction Damage 
386 
256 
175 
10 
19 
36 
0.019 
0.029 
0.043 
0.833 
0.700 
0.554 
10 
50 
90 
 
People exposed in the open to the direct effects of blast appear to be able to withstand explosions rather better 
than most buildings. The probable total destruction of buildings will happen at overpressure equal to 68.9 kPa. 
These results from the blast wave hazard have been linked with GIS software and the areas of probable damage 
are displayed as circular buffer zones on a computerised map in Figures 1 to 5.  
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Figure 1: Buffer zones for probability of human eardrum rupture around LPG tank. 
 
Figure 2: Buffer zones for probability of human lung haemorrhage around LPG tank 
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Figure 3: Buffer zones for probability of human fatality around LPG tank. 
 
Figure 4: Buffer zones for probability of glass breakage around LPG tank. 
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Figure 5: Buffer zones for construction damage around LPG tank (an industrial zone where  numbers in the 
boxes are lots of land occupied by other industries) 
For calculating the hazards from fragmentations shattered by explosion, the best estimation is done by Equations 
23 and 24 to evaluate the danger and safety distances respectively. Furthermore information’s have been given 
by Equations 25 and 26 to estimate maximum ranges of rocks and soils which can shatter and fly from the 
explosion. The results are indicated in Table 3.  
Table 3: Fragments travel distances from explosion 
m (kg) maxD (m) BLEVEt (s) liftofft  (s) BLEVEH (s) ialDint (m) 
 
60,000 
 
231.46 
 
14.41 
 
6.88 
 
173.59 
 
300.89 
 
According to point-source model 80 to 90% of rocketing fragments fall within 926 m; and as illustrated from the 
analyses of the travel range of fragment missiles where 90% probability of rocketing would be effected on  
majority land (Figure 6)  in a circle  700 m radius. Some debris might be reached  over 1 km from the accident  
American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2016) Volume 26, No  4, pp 343-363 
360 
 
and thus,  personnel should be shifted beyond anticipated area in case of evacuation needed (Birk ,1995). 
The probability of human fatality and injury has been calculated by using Eqs. 27 and 28. The results is 
summarised in Table 4and the probabilities of fatality and injury was drown graphically around the LPG 
location as presented in Figures 7 and 8. 
Table 4: Probabilities for human fatality or injury by fragmentation 
Probability ( )%,P  
 
Fatality ( )mr  
 
Injury ( )mr  
10 
50 
90 
291 
130 
71 
 
1692 
1100 
725 
 
 
Figure 6: Fragmentation range. 
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Figure 7: Probability of human fatality from fragmentation. 
 
Figure 8: Probability of human injury from fragmentation (an industrial zone where  numbers in the  boxes are  
lots of land occupied by other industries) 
5. Conclusion 
Mapping, the visual display of information, is an extremely powerful tool for understanding and managing risk. 
Risk inherently involves a geographical component. It occurs at locations in space where receptors (human or 
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environment) and hazards come together. GIS powerful tools can pinpoint all the chemical hazards events and 
mapping of environmental and risk area. The blast wave from BLEVE can damage structures in the industrial 
zone and effects to people and the environment. It is a good estimation of safe distances for the industrial zone 
and surrounding community. These important information could be presented by utilising of GIS and  in fact 
can be seen clearly on the maps. Zones for probabilities of human fatality and injury and  construction damage 
have been classified on the location map. Consequences result was obtained from calculation using TNT 
equivalent model and selected equations. The probit functions have been used here to identify probability and 
effect of peak overpressure to people and structures. The stakeholders can make use the technology for  
estimating explosion effects  from a BLEVE event in which the result of consequences are plotted by buffer 
zones 10%, 50%, and 90% likelihood for managing risk in an industrial zone. Based on the estimation 
probability, consequences and on the information retrieved by the available databases and GIS in the operational 
center, future development outside the industrial zone must be  beyond  a radius of 1000 m of the LPG terminal.  
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